The Burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania

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THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG.

LETTER I.

My dear Friend:

Your request to give you a succinct and, as far as may be, detailed account of the terrible calamity with which our town was visited on the 30th day of July, is received. You are pleased to say, that not only my long residence in the place, but the fact that I had, as on former occasions, so also during the present one, remained at home, gives me a right to speak on the subject, without fear of cavil or sneer from those who are ready, either from ignorance or something worse, to misrepresent the facts in the case, or apply the ill-timed weapons of ridicule and sarcasm against statements which have appeared in print. Passing by your other remarks, which I may be permitted to set down as emanating from personal partiality, I shall proceed to give you, as perfectly as I can, and as briefly as the subject will allow, a somewhat detailed account of the terrible disaster, with an honest endeavor to avoid all special pleading and overdrawn statements, dealing only in simple matters of fact, as far as I have been able to gather them, either from personal knowledge or unquestionable authority.

The Military Situation on the Border.

Before proceeding directly to the narration of the terrible catastrophe, it may be well to glance at the military situation on our border. This seems the more necessary from the fact, that a very large portion of the public prints have been misled into the belief, and consequently have unwittingly led their readers to believe that, “if the citizens of Chambersburg had turned out to resist the enemy, the burning and pillage of the town could have been averted,” inasmuch as the rebel force, according to some statements, was very trifling, “scarcely numbering two hundred men.” You, my dear friend, are laboring under this erroneous belief yourself. Allow me, therefore, to turn your attention to the following facts, which are well established, and which can be corroborated by any amount of evidence.

General Couch, the commander of this military division, had under his control a company of about one hundred men at Mercersburg, sixteen miles southwest from here, and a section of a battery of artillery in this place. This was the entire military force in the Cumberland Valley, under the control of our military commander, at the time. Several Pennsylvania regiments which had previously been organized for the defence of the border, through the efforts of our vigilant Governor, had been summoned by the General Government to Washington and the Potomac Army. One hundred men and two small cannon—that was all.

But you ask: “Was not General Averill near enough to have prevented the rebels from executing their nefarious design upon your town? and, if so, why did not General Couch inform him of the situation of affairs, and urge him forward?” The answer is at hand. General Couch did attempt to inform General Averill in time of the fact that the enemy, with a force about three thousand strong, had crossed the Potomac west of Williamsport, and was moving by way of Mercersburg and St. Thomas directly on Chambersburg. Averill was encamped one mile from Greencastle (ten from Chambersburg) on Friday night, July 29. The first two messengers with despatches from General Couch, could not find him. The third messenger succeeded accidentally in finding him after midnight in a field. Averill only now discovered that he had been flanked by the enemy, and expressed himself greatly surprised and chagrined to the messenger at this state of things. Whether he was to blame, it is not for me to say. It is sufficient for my purpose just now to know that, beyond two small cannon and one hundred men, we were without any military protection....