Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism

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CHAPTER I.

Interest has revived in the works of Sextus Empiricus in recent times, especially, one may say, since the date of Herbart. There is much in the writings of Sextus that finds a parallel in the methods of modern philosophy. There is a common starting-point in the study of the power and limitations of human thought. There is a common desire to investigate the phenomena of sense-perception, and the genetic relations of man to the lower animals, and a common interest in the theory of human knowledge.

While, however, some of the pages of Sextus' works would form a possible introduction to certain lines of modern philosophical thought, we cannot carry the analogy farther, for Pyrrhonism as a whole lacked the essential element of all philosophical progress, which is a belief in the possibility of finding and establishing the truth in the subjects investigated.

Before beginning a critical study of the writings of Sextus Empiricus, and the light which they throw on the development of Greek Scepticism, it is necessary to make ourselves somewhat familiar with the environment in which he lived and wrote. We shall thus be able to comprehend more fully the standpoint from which he regarded philosophical questions.

Let us accordingly attempt to give some details of his life, including his profession, the time when he lived, the place of his birth, the country in which he taught, and the general aim and character of his works. Here, however, we encounter great difficulties, for although we possess most of the writings of Sextus well preserved, the evidence which they provide on the points mentioned is very slight. He does not give us biographical details in regard to himself, nor does he refer to his contemporaries in a way to afford any exact knowledge of them. His name even furnishes us with a problem impossible of solution. He is called ΣГЎВЅВіξτος ГЎВЅВЃ ГЎВјВђμπειρικος by Diogenes Laertius : ГЎВјВ©ροδГЏЕ’του δГЎВЅВІ διГЋВ®κουσε ΣГЎВЅВіξτος ГЎВЅВЃ ГЎВјВђμπειρρικГЏЕ’ς οá½— καГЎВЅВ¶ τГЎВЅВ° δГЎВЅВіκα τГЎВїВ¶ν σκεπτικГЎВїВ¶ν καГЎВЅВ¶ ἄλλα κГЎВЅВ±λλιστα' ΣГЎВЅВіξτου δГЎВЅВІ διГЋВ®κουσε Σατορνá¿‘νος ГЎВЅВЃ Κυθῆνας ГЎВјВђμπεικГЎВЅВёς καГЎВЅВ¶ αГЎВЅВђτГЏЕ’ς. Although in this passage Diogenes speaks of Sextus the second time without the surname, we cannot understand the meaning otherwise than that Diogenes considered Sextus a physician of the Empirical School. Other evidence also is not wanting that Sextus bore this surname. Fabricius, in his edition of the works of Sextus, quotes from the Tabella de Sectis Medicorum of Lambecius the statement that Sextus was called Empiricus because of his position in medicine.

Pseudo-Galen also refers to him as one of the directors of the Empirical School, and calls him ΣГЎВЅВіξτος ГЎВЅВЃ ГЎВјВђμπειρικГЏЕ’ς. His name is often found in the manuscripts written with the surname, as for example at the end of Logic II. In other places it is found written without the surname, as Fabricius testifies, where Sextus is mentioned as a Sceptic in connection with Pyrrho.

Diog. Laert. IX. 12, 116.

Fabricius Testimonia, p. 2.

Pseudo-Galen Isag. 4; Fabricius Testimonia, p. 2.

Bekker Math. VIII. 481.

The Sceptical School was long closely connected with the Empirical School of medicine, and the later Pyrrhoneans, when they were physicians, as was often the case, belonged for the most part to this school. Menedotus of Nicomedia is the first Sceptic, however, who is formally spoken of as an Empirical physician, and his contemporary Theodas of Laodicea was also an Empirical physician. The date of Menedotus and Theodas is difficult to fix, but Brochard and Hass agree that it was about 150 A.D. After the time of these two physicians, who were also each in turn at the head of the Sceptical School, there seems to have been a definite alliance between Pyrrhonism and Empiricism in medicine, and we have every reason to believe that this alliance existed until the time of Sextus.

Diog. IX. 12, 115.

Brochard Op. cit. Livre IV. p. 311.

Diog. IX. 12, 116.

The difficulty in regard to the name arises from Sextus' own testimony. In the first book of the Hypotyposes he takes strong ground against the identity of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism in medicine. Although he introduces his objections with the admission that "some say that they are the same," in recognition of the close union that had existed between them, he goes on to say that "Empiricism is neither Scepticism itself, nor would it suit the Sceptic to take that sect upon himself", for the reason that Empiricism maintains dogmatically the impossibility of knowledge, but he would prefer to belong to the Methodical School, which was the only medical school worthy of the Sceptic. "For this alone of all the medical sects, does not proceed rashly it seems to me, in regard to unknown things, and does not presume to say whether they are comprehensible or not, but it is guided by phenomena. It will thus be seen that the Methodical School of medicine has a certain relationship to Scepticism which is closer than that of the other medical sects."

Hyp....